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This paper introduces a discrete-time intertemporal investment model in which the flow 
of profits affects the risk premium on the cost of finance, and, as a consequence, the rate 
of discount of future profits. While public investments, according to a consolidated 
literature, constitute the main bulk of innovation policies, this model is used to comment 
and interpret the potential use of another, secondary, public policy, consisting of tax 
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1 Introduction 
The first basic element characterizing the expenditure in R&D is the fact that the link 
between expenditure in R&D and technological innovation is wrought with significant 
uncertainty. Positive externalities for firms that have not borne the initial costs of R&D 
are determined by the nature of public goods characterizing technological knowledge. 
Technological spillovers and the appropriability of knowledge limit the effectiveness of 
patents that do not always constitute a totally satisfactory instrument for the firm 
undertaking potential investments in R&D. For these reasons, a consolidated literature 
in the field promotes the role of public investments in R&D for product innovation. 
Another basic element is the fact that technical innovation—by affecting both the 
technology of the production process and consumer demand—can deeply alter market 
characteristics and the context in which competition takes place. 
The analysis of the (non) success of the Schumpeterian approach in explaining the 
process of technical innovation is beyond the scope of this paper, but it might be 
interesting to note that Rosenberg (1982, 2000) provides wide historical and empirical 
evidence for the US, which suggests that technological innovation in many industries 
has been successfully introduced by the new entrants rather than incumbent dominant 
firms. From the point of view of the policymaker (and clearly in case of developing 
countries), the question appears rather complex. According to the literature, large-scale 
investments in R&D and innovation need to be covered by public investments, due to 
strong externalities and spillovers. However, the particular portion of R&D expenditure 
analysed by Rosenberg and performed by marginal ‘new entrant’ firms, raises two sets 
of difficulties. First of all, in highly concentrated markets, oligopolistic dominant firms 
tend to create barriers to entry against the new entrants who (in Rosenberg’s analysis) 
might be potential carriers of new technology and who face highly uncertain payoffs. 
Under these circumstances, expected profits of the potential entrants must be 
significantly high in order to trigger entry and generate new technology. In this specific 
situation, the role of public investments and public incentives for innovation is not 
trivial. It is rather difficult to assess the projects that deserve being funded since the 
decision is, to a large extent, subjective, arbitrary, and characterized by information 
asymmetries as well as by the obvious problems of monitoring and moral hazard for 
receiving public incentives. Furthermore, even with the best of intentions there is an 
intrinsic problem of time inconsistency—what could appear at first to be a good 
research project might not always turn into a good invention. This constitutes the 
free-rider problem, an important argument in favour of public investment in R&D. But 
what about innovations by new entrants and those associated to market dynamics and 
configuration? Barriers to entry could generate a distortion in the process of invention 
and reduce the R&D incentives.  
The main policy proposal of this paper consists of reducing one kind of distortion 
(barriers to entry) by moderating another kind of distortion (tax distortion) through the 
use of tax incentives for firms that conduct successful innovation. 
Financial markets play a very relevant role for the entry of potential carriers of new 
technology. In particular, in transition economies and developing countries the size and 
efficiency of financial markets constitute a key factor for the efficient allocation of 
resources.  
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Table 
R&D expenditure in % of GDP 
Year 2001 
Country  All sectors   Private firms 
Belgium  2.2      1.6 
Denmark  2.4      1.7 
Germany  2.5      1.8 
Spain  1.0      0.5 
France  2.2      1.4 
Italy  1.1      0.6 
Netherlands (year 2000)  1.9      1.1 
UK  3.0      1.3 
Japan (year 2000)  3.0      2.1 
US  2.7      2.1 
Source:   Baussola (2003).  
To understand the relevance of the link between efficient financial markets and 
technological innovation, one might consider the case of Italy. A former G8 country, 
Italy suffers from an unsatisfactory level of R&D expenditure and is witnessing a lively 
debate on the causes of its industrial decline. The country has always been characterized 
by (i) a relatively imperfect system of juridical protection for small shareholders, 
(ii) rather undeveloped financial markets (at least compared to bank intermediation), 
(iii) a relatively small number of public companies, (iv) significant concentration and 
rigidities in the market for entrepreneurial control not necessarily associated with the 
market for shares.1  
In addition, many companies (small as well as large) have been controlled by the same 
family of entrepreneurs for several generations. Buckhart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2002) 
point out that, on the one hand, this ownership feature reduces the agency problems 
since it is characterized by the relationship between owners and managers while on the 
other hand, it raises very relevant problems concerning the selection process of 
executive managers because these tend to be appointed on the basis of family links 
rather that on the basis of their professional abilities. A similar situation is also apparent 
in the less efficient financial markets with a relatively small number of public 
companies, where strong bias and disincentives of external shareholders and investors 
create problems in investment financing. Furthermore, Santarelli and Vivarelli (2002) 
and Lotti, Santarelli and Vivarelli (2001) note that the birth of new firms is, statistically 
speaking, very significant in Italy, but these new entrants are in general very small, have 
a high probability of exit and have historically been supported by very unselective and 
distortionary policy incentives. Incentives are strongly oriented toward the production 
of traditional commodities in the industrial sector, but are rather weak in all hi-tech 
sectors where size and scale economies pay a relevant and strategic role. According to 
many analysts, this is possibly one of the main causes of the decline of the Italian 
industry. 
 
                                                 
1   Hostile takeovers have historically been extremely rare and therefore the controlling groups of 
shareholders have a complete control of their companies.   3
2 The  model 
In a world of financial market imperfections due to information asymmetries, the 
internally generated cash flow constitutes a cheaper source of finance than borrowing or 
issuing new shares. The behaviour of the share price and capital gains may affect the 
dividend policy of the management which in turn impacts on the firm’s financial 
structure by determining the rate of retention of profits, subsequently affecting the 
volume of investments financed by internal finance. All of these are factors that may 
have relevant implications for the standard intertemporal investment decision. If the 
firm’s financial structure is affected by profits retention and if the cost of financial 
capital is affected by the firm’s financial structure, then to the extent that the (firm 
specific) discount factor is assimilated to the cost of financial capital, a causal link for 
the firm’s intertemporal investment decision is established between its profits, financial 
structure and discount rate for the future profits. Timing in the coordination process 
between financial and investment decisions is essential for the definition of flow 
variables. For this reason we introduce here a discrete-time optimal control model with 
a recursive structure, with financial markets imperfections and diverging incentives 
between the management and external shareholders. 
In this model, financial and real investment decisions take place simultaneously. The 
goods market is assumed to be imperfectly competitive, although perfect competition 
can be a particular case. On the basis of the assumptions summarized in the previous 
section, the management is assumed to be able to decide how to allocate the firm’s cash 
flow once the creditors are repaid and shareholders have been remunerated consistently 
with a yield that depends on the average market yield of the shares. Average market 
yield of the shares will, of course, influence the remuneration owners expect to receive 
from their financial investments. Furthermore, given that the managers are assumed to 
fully control the firm and its cash-flow allocation, the actual amount of dividends paid 
to the shareholders is the result of an implicit negotiation between management and 
external shareholders. It can be affected by a number of factors related in general to the 
existing relationship between management and external shareholders. In particular, the 
management may or may not have the incentive to reveal information on the firm’s 
profitability. If this is the case, the stock price might not react (at least in the short run) 
to changes in the profitability of the firm. On the other hand, if we allow for the 
possibility of speculative bubbles (at least in the short run), and if we admit that in the 
short run the share price might overshoot its theoretical level as implied by the net 
present value of future profits, we must include this fact in the rational financial choice 
of the management. 
The model is formalized with the optimal control approach in order to explicitly refer to 
the standard results of the investment model and to emphasize how different the results 
can be by simply introducing some common assumptions of financial market 
imperfections, risk premium on the remuneration of finance raised by the firm, which 
may be affected by information spreading regarding the outcome of R&D expenditures 
carried out by the firm. In order to take into account the relevance of timing in real and 
financial decisions (which cannot be accounted for over a continual time period in an 
optimal control model), we introduce a recursive structure for the intertemporal problem 
of the firm’s investments. 
The capital is installed at time t-1, and is funded with financial sources raised by the 
firm at time t-1, reflecting remuneration or expected remuneration at time t. Investment   4
decisions, the production process (generating the profits πt) as well as payment of 
interest on borrowed capital and dividends on own capital take place at time t. Φ
*
t is the 
weighted average of the cost of own capital and borrowed capital, established at time t-1 
and paid at time t.2 . 
We assume that the time horizon of the decisionmakers (the management) corresponds 
to their expected residual time m of being in control in the company. This assumption is 
actually as arbitrary as assuming that the time horizon is infinite. Expectational 
equivalence is assumed to hold.  
The problem of the firm may be represented in the following way: 
        m 
Vt = Σ {[ E(πt(kt-1|ν*,ωl*)) − I t] ⋅ [1 /(1+ Φ
*
t−1)
 t−1 ]}  (1) 
       
t=1 
 
where  πt(kt-1|ν*,ωl*) is defined as the (strictly concave) maximum value function, 
conditional on the parameter ν* (describing possible shocks on profits) and on the 
labour costs ω l*). In what follows, we assume ν* and ωl* to be given and will omit 
them in the rest of the paper.3 
 
kt-1 is the capital installed at time t−1, I t-1 is the amount of investments decided at time t 
that will contribute to determining the stock of capital at time t+1. 
Φ
*
t-1 represents the minimized cost of financial capital at time t−1: we return to this 
variable below when defining one of the constraints. 
The maximand (1) is subject to the following constraints: 
Law of motion of investments 
It = k
 
t – (1−δ) k
 
t−1   (2) 
with 0 < δ < 1 being the rate of capital depreciation;  
Flow of funds constraint: 
It = π t (k
 




t−1 +  ΔB t  + ΔΕ t     (3) 
Balance sheet constraint: 
k
 
t = E t + R t + B t   (4) 
Where B t is the outstanding debt at time ‘t’, ΔB t its variation between time t-1 and time 
t, Et the outstanding shares valuated at their issuing price, Rt the accumulated reserves, 
                                                 
2  For the discrete-time extension and applicability of Pontryagin maximum principle with finite time 
horizon, see Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987: 207-10 and 370-7) and Tu (1991). 
3  To support this sort of ceteris paribus assumption, we can think of a labour market characterized by a 
simplified efficiency wage mechanism in which wages and employment are fixed in the short run and 
are affected mainly by macroeconomic factors   5
i.e., the past non-distributed profits, Φ
*
t-1 the (optimized) cost of financial capital, 
defined as the weighted average of debt and internal finance as follows: 
Φ
*
t = min [μ [rt
f+ φ (μ t)]+ (1- μ) it]   (5) 
where it represents the cost of internally generated own capital, defined below, r 
f
t  is the 
risk-free interest rate, φ (μ t) is the risk premium on the interest rate on the firm’s 
borrowing, which is assumed to be a monotonically increasing function of the gearing 
ratio μt= Bt/kt,  and Φ
*
t represents the minimum value function of the firm’s financial 
cost minimization problem. 
The rate of discount of future profits is the (optimized) cost of finance that contains a 
risk premium function of the gearing ratio and therefore (given the assumptions of the 




t [φ (π t)]. 
Intuitively speaking, one can easily see that by allowing unexpected random shocks on 
the profits, the higher the profits, the less likely is the firm to go bankrupt. 
At every time t the firm optimizes its financial structure by choosing the optimal gearing 
ratio  μt= B t/kt that minimizes the cost of financial capital, defined as the weighted 
average between the borrowed and internally generated finance. Φ
*
t obviously 
represents the rate at which the firm can raise external finance for its investments, and 
can transfer resources from time t to time t+1 . 
The optimized financial structure determines the rate of discount appearing in the 
intertemporal problem, which is conditional on the flow of non-distributed profits of the 
previous period. In this way the ‘firm  specific’ rate of discount is recursively 
determined as a function of the lagged stock of physical capital and lagged cost of 
financial capital.  
it is defined as follows: 
it =D* /(E0 + Rt)   (6) 
where the issuing price (at time 0) of the N firm’s shares is: 
E0 = ps,0 ⋅ Nt 
Rt, the non-distributed profits of all the previous years, from the starting year t=0, are 
defined as follows: 
        t 
Rt = Σ Wi 
      
i=0 
and 
D*= r*s,t ⋅ ps,t ⋅ Nt − Δ ps,t Nt  
Where, again,  
r*s,  = the yield on the firm’s share at time t; 
ps,t  = the share price;  
Δ ps,t   = its variation with respect to time t−1;  
Nt  = the number of existing shares.   6
In other words, given the share price, the short-run capital gain and the (exogenous) 
yield  r*s,t  that the management allows for its shareholders, we can determine the 
amount of paid dividends. In this regard, we could have two possible situations: the first 
(and extreme) one is the standard neoclassical investment model; the second one 
corresponds to a situation in which the management pays dividends strictly in an 
amount consistent with the market yield of the shares and the share price might not 
always reflect (in the short run) the net present value of future profits. 
In order to have the standard neoclassical investment model with efficient financial 
markets: 
i)  Share prices must adjust perfectly and instantaneously to the value implied by 
the profits; 
ii)  Cash flows (net of adjustment costs of investments) are to be entirely 
exhausted as interest and dividend payments (i.e., no agency problem and no 
incentive for the managers to keep the cash flow—as far as possible given the 
yield on shares—within the firm). 
In all the other cases, the stock price in the short run may diverge from the value 
implied by the net present worth of future profits. This is our assumption in the 
remainder of the paper. 
If stock prices were to be affected by the endogenous propagation of expectations (as, 
for instance, in Kurz’s ‘rational beliefs’ theory), then the share price would be subjected 
to a number of shocks and would follow a path apparently uncorrelated (or only very 
weakly correlated) in the short run to actual profits. 
In order to explain the ‘irrational exuberance’ of some years ago, many mainstream 
authors (for instance, Miller, Weller and Zhang 2002) had to invoke a theory of some 
sort of long-lasting bubble in order to justify the puzzle of the Nasdaq index in 1996-
2001. In this context, again stock prices in the ‘short run’ would be exogenous with 
respect to ‘real’ profits even though the ‘short run’ in this case would be as short as a 
decade. 
On the other hand, even without being as sceptical as Kurz on the efficiency of financial 
markets, if one admitted that stock prices may diverge for a sufficiently long enough 
period from the value implied by the profits of firms, managers may lack the incentive 
to reveal all information regarding the firm’s profitability and they may prefer not to 
exhaust profits into dividends and interest payments. 
Under these assumptions, we can consider the share price to be exogenously determined 
in the short run. 
Note that for the shareholder the yield on shares is given by:  
r*s,t = [D*/( ps,t ⋅ Nt) ] + (Δ ps,t / ps,t ) 
while for the management the cost of capital is affected by the (exogenous) book value 
p0,t⋅Nt of the shares. However, for a given (and exogenous) value of (Δ ps,t / ps,t ), it is 
easy to verify that if (Δ ps,t / ps,t ) were subject to shocks, these would have an impact on 
the dividend policy and consequently on the firm’s financial structure and investment   7
decisions. Note that due to the assumptions made here regarding the control of the 
cash flow by insiders, once the shares have been issued, their market value is relevant to 
the managers only to the extent that it contributes to determining their dividend policy. 
For this reason, the notation ΔΕt or Εt is different from the notation employed to 
indicate the value of newly issued shares.  
The above assumptions generate not only a recursive structure in the problem but also a 
certain persistence of the influence of past profits on the discount rate. The extent of this 
persistence is implicitly limited by the rate of capital depreciation δ. 
Since the internally generated finance is predetermined (by the non-distributed profits at 
time  t−1), by choosing the value Xt of the newly borrowed finance, the firm also 
determines the maximum amount of feasible new investments at time t and the gearing 
ratio at time t, which will be incorporated in the new debt contracts issued by the firm in 
order to finance a part of its investments. 
Let us now analyse the minimum value function Φ
*
t. Assuming that the second-order 
conditions are satisfied, the first-order conditions are the following: 
dΦ
*
t /dt = r 
f
t + φ (μ t) + μ t φ ’(μ t) − it = 0 
The above equation (stating that in equilibrium the marginal cost of borrowing equals 
the marginal cost of the internally generated finance) can be simplified by assuming that 
ξ = φ (μ t)+μ tφ’(μ t) can be rearranged into a monotonically increasing and invertible 
function of μ t .  One can easily verify that this is always true if φ (μ t) is convex in μ t, 
as we are assuming henceforth in the model.4 In this case we get: 
μ t  = ξ 
−1 (it −r 
f
t) (7) 
In other words, this means that the gearing ratio is an increasing function of the 
difference between the cost of own capital it and the interest rate on risk-free assets r 
f
t, 
because, for a given r 
f
t, the higher the cost of own capital, the higher the incentive for 
the firm to borrow by increasing the gearing ratio. At each time, by choosing the level 
of debt, the managers simultaneously affect the investments (i.e., the control variable), 
the financial structure and the cost of finance. 
By looking at the constraints (2), (3)΄ and (4), one immediately sees that they both are 
dynamic equations putting into relation two flow variables It and Xt = ΔBt with the state 
variable k at two different moments in time t−1 and t. 
In particular, while It relates the state variables kt−1 and kt to a given rate of 
discount Φ
*
t, Xt does the same job and determines in addition (together with kt) the 
                                                 
4  This would be true also if φ (μ t) were concave but with a second derivative sufficiently small in 
absolute value, i.e., if its curvature is ‘relatively flat’. However, the assumption of convexity for φ (μ t) 
is rather general, since it could capture the situation in which highly-indebted firms would have to pay 
an extremely high risk premium on borrowed capital. Furthermore, if the analytical form of φ (μ t) 
were such that it tended asymptotically to infinite when μ t approaches 1, one could reproduce the case 
of credit rationing by introducing appropriate analytical form and parameters for the function φ (μ t).   8
optimal rate of discount. In other words, in contrast to the conventional neoclassical 
intertemporal investment models, it is not I t but Xt  that acts as a control variable in this 
context. 




t−1 − Xt, we may express (1) in 
terms of the control variable Xt  and the state variable k
 
t−1 , while by putting together the 
two constraints (3)΄ and we can eliminate It and express the intertemporal constraints 
also in terms of Xt. Therefore the firm’s problem can be redefined as follows: 
                 m 








t − Xt+1] ⋅ [1 /(1+ Φ 
*
 t)
 t ]} (8) 
            





t = (1−δ) k
 






t−1 + Xt      
if one allowed for shocks in the profit function πt(kt-1|ν*,ωl*), for instance, by letting ν* 
be subjected to shocks, these would be transferred to the rate of discount of future 
profits from the next period on. In addition, as we can see again from (5), (7) and (4), 
the firm’s discount rate is affected by the share price and its variations. In other words, a 
financial shock modifying the optimal dividend policy of the firm’s managers would 
also modify the cost of own capital, the optimal gearing ratio, and, as a consequence, 
the discount rate. Of course, the specific nature of these causal links would depend on 
the nature of the relationship between π and p, i.e., how efficient the financial market is 
and how fast and efficiently information spreads from the profits of the firm to its stock 
price. 
3  A slightly unconventional result 
We are now able to write the discrete Hamiltonian as follows: 









t − Xt+1] ⋅ [1 /(1+ Φ 
*
 t)
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 t = 1 
 
+  λt( Xt − k
 
t + (1−δ) k
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i−1 ⋅ ki−1 )] 
       I = 0 
The definition for it allows us to clarify the link between profits, information spreading, 
share prices and dividend policy. For instance, if the managers lack incentives to reveal 
information on the profitability of the firm, the share price might not react (at least in 
the short run) to increases in profits. Therefore, the numerator of it would not change   9
and the denominator would increase. This means that an increase in πi (k
 
i−1) would be 
associated to a reduction in the cost of own capital and, hence, on the average cost of 
capital. 
On the other hand, if an increase in the firm’s profitability determines an increasing and 
persistent capital gain, the numerator of it would be small again: in other words, own 
capital would become relatively cheap (as long as Δ p s,t increases) since the 
management, due to capital gains, would need to pay less dividends to external 
shareholders to keep them happy. 
Given the assumptions we made on the cost of own capital and determination of 
dividends, any shock to the exogenous share price would be transferred to the dividends 
and hence to it and the optimal financial structure μ, which determines (through (7)) the 
rate of discount of future profits. In other words, by substituting (5), (6), and (7) into 
(4), Φ
*





t (μt (r 
f
t , r*s,t , πt )| ps,t , Δ ps,t)  
Assuming now that the regularity conditions for Ht  are satisfied, an easy and 
straightforward application of the Tu definition of the ‘discrete maximum principle’ 
(Tu 1991: 261-4) yields the following results: 
∂Ht / ∂Xt = 0   ⇒  λt = 1  (9) 
∂Ht / ∂kt−1 = λt 
which imply 
(∂πt / ∂kt−1)  − δ  = (∂Φ
*
t / ∂Wt) ⋅ ((∂ πt  / ∂kt−1)  − Φ
*













t / ∂Wt)  ⋅ ((∂πt / ∂kt−1)  − Φ
*
t−1 )  ⋅ kt + 
   m 





i/∂Wi) ⋅((∂πi /∂ki−1) − Φ
*











The left-hand side of (10) is, of course, the marginal profitability of capital, net of the 
rate of depreciation of k. The right-hand side of (10) is composed of three addends, one 
for each row. The first one can be considered as the effect of how modifications in  
the discount rate generated by a change in the state variable affect the way in which the 




t − Xt+1 are discounted. 
The second addend (second row) describes how the same modifications in the discount 
rate again modify the flow of dividends and interest rates that have to be paid on   
the future capital kt (which, given the balance sheet constraint of the firm, is equal to the 
financial capital Bt + Rt). The third addend (third row) represents the total of the two 
above-mentioned effects for the remaining future periods. 
Intuitively we can assume that any shock to the profit function on the left-hand side of 
the above equation (i.e., any shock affecting the functional link between profits and 
capital such as technology shocks, but also shocks in the market structure or in the 
degree of competition among firms) determines both the shock on the cost of financial 
(10)   10
capital, and a second shock on the rate of discount of future profits. This happens 
because in imperfect financial markets, the cost at which the management is able to 
raise funds is bound to be affected by the risk premium and by the cash flow. In 
addition, the converse is also true: any (exogenous in this framework) shock to the 
discount rate (caused, for instance, by a speculative bubble increasing share prices) 
affects the cost of external finance (since the managers need to pay less dividends to 
shareholders in order to keep them happy) and hence the rate of discount, by increasing 
the right-hand side of the above equation. All of this brings about a modification in the 
marginal profitability of capital, in the left-hand side of the above equation.  
Equation (10) can be rearranged as follows: 
 




t / ∂Wt) ⋅ ((∂ πt  / ∂kt−1)  − Φ
*
t−1 ) ⋅(1 /(1 + Φ 
*
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*









The expression (It + (1+Φ
*
t)kt) might be interpreted as the total capital absorption (i.e., 
capital stock plus investments) plus capital remuneration at time t. Since the marginal 
profitability of capital associates a change in profits to a change in the stock of capital, 
the first line of (11) contains the difference between profits and capital absorption and 





The term ((∂ πt  / ∂kt−1)− Φ
*
t−1) ⋅(1 /(1+ Φ 
*
t)) is the present value of the spread between 
(∂ πt  / ∂kt−1) and (∂ πt  / ∂kt−1) that would be obtained if nothing changes at time t+1. The 




t)⋅(1 /(1+ Φ 
*
t))] is the present value of the difference between 
profits at time t+1 and capital absorption and remuneration at time t+1. 
The term (∂Φ
*
t/∂Wt) is the impact of the firm’s wealth on the risk premium and hence 
on the capital cost. Therefore the marginal profitability of capital (net of depreciation) 
may be decomposed into (∂Φ
*
t  / ∂Wt) ⋅ ((∂ πt  / ∂kt−1)   − Φ
*
t−1  ) ⋅(1 /(1+  Φ 
*
t)) and 




t)⋅(1 /(1+ Φ 
*
t))] as well as their future net present discounted values. 
Generally speaking, (11) could be interpreted as a link between the marginal 
profitability of the capital and the financial value of the firm. 
In other words, the portion of marginal profitability of capital not paid out by the 
management as remuneration for shares and debt, has an impact on the firm’s   
financial reserves, and hence on the discount rate of future profits and on the value of 
the firm. 
The results presented here diverge slightly from the conventional neoclassical 
investment model because the assumptions made with regard to the cash flow control of 
the managers, the fact that the market for shares is not necessarily associated with the 
market for the firm’s control, and, finally, financial market imperfections (and imperfect 
adjustment of the share price to the value implied by the discounted future profits) 
introduce a causal link between the flow of profits, the firm’s financial structure and the 
rate of discount of the future flow of profits. This can be interpreted as an 
‘inside-the-firm’ channel of transmission of financial shocks to real investments. This 
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framework could also help explain some recent empirical results claiming that the 
inclusion of appropriate measures for stock market yields and capital gains would make 
the internal cash flow statistically non-significant in investment regressions based on 
firms’ panel data (for instance, Gomes 2001). In fact, to the extent that both current 
profits and stock prices simultaneously contribute to determining the (endogenous) rate 
of discount of future profits, they could turn out to be statistically co-determined and 
simultaneously correlated with investments through the firm specific rate of discount of 
future profits. If the firm enjoys a long period of high profits and its stock price 
overshoots the value implied by the profits (like in the excess volatility case à la Shiller) 
so that the firm experiences increasing capital gains for an extended period (as in the 
‘irrational exuberance’ case), the results become even stronger. In other words, an 
increasingly overvalued share price makes the internally generated finance cheaper 
because it allows the managers to pay out less in dividends (and still keep the 
shareholders satisfied since they are remunerated by the capital gain). This could 
contribute to the explanation as to why some recent empirical analyses (e.g., Gomes 
2001) find that introducing appropriate measures for stock market prices in an 
investment regression seems to reduce the statistical significance of the internally 
generated cash flow. 
4  Interpretation of the results and policy considerations  
The model suggests a feedback mechanism between profits, the cost of capital and the 
firm’s investments. With imperfect financial markets, the stock price (due to imperfect 
information and the incentive of management not to fully reveal privileged information 
on the profitability of the firm) may, in the short run, deviate from the value implied by 
the discounted future dividends. Obviously the nature and characteristics of this 
feedback depend on the assumption made regarding the relationship between future 
profits, the price of the firm’s shares, the yield on shares and how the cost of finance is 
affected by the behaviour of stock prices (i.e., whether and how the risk premium on 
firm’s finance reacts to the information revealed by the behaviour of stock prices). 
The efficiency and the level of development of financial markets play a crucial role in 
the process of economic growth, to the extent that they finance technological 
innovation. In this regard, a very relevant piece of information with regard to the 
developing countries could be provided through further empirical research on the link 
between financial market efficiency, credit market efficiency, intensity in R&D 
expenditure and growth. In particular, the model shows a ‘double channel of 
transmission’ of shocks to investments. By simplifying the feedback mechanism 
between profits and the cost of financial capital, it has been shown that the interaction 
between financial and investment decisions introduces an additional ‘financial’ channel 
of causation between profits and real investments. This financial channel can potentially 
amplify the effects of an exogenous shock in a firm’s profits on its investments. 
The model can also be used to analyse the effects of public policy for encouraging 
innovation and investments in R&D. Of course, the main bulk of innovation policies 
should be based on public investment. However, obvious potential exists for innovation 
policies associated with concentrated markets where innovation is conducted by 
potential entrants and is bound to affect the market structure (and make it more 
competitive). This would consist of tax incentives for firms that have (i) documented a   12
certain level of expenditure in R&D (for instance, beyond a certain threshold defined as 
a percentage of its sales), (ii) registered patents (thus providing evidence of product 
innovation), (iii) issued shares on the local stock market beyond a certain threshold of 
their own capital (thereby contributing to the increased size of the market for control by 
firms and to the size of the stock market in general) and (iv) have attained positive 
profits for a specific time period after issuing shares. These, in terms of our model, 
would have a double impact on the level of investments in R&D. 
First of all, there is an impact on the flow of profits. Technological innovation in itself 
would increase the profit flow of the firm that has made R&D investments, thereby 
increasing the firm’s payoff if the R&D investment was fruitful. 
Furthermore, a second impact could be achieved through a reduction in the cost of 
finance that is carried over by the process of information spreading taking place in 
financial markets and which would convey knowledge of successful investment in 
R&D. The subsequent reduction in risk premium (both on debt and stock issued by the 
firm) would reduce the discount factor of the future flow of profits. This would also 
increase the incentive for investing in the capital that was the object of successful 
expenditure in R&D. 
Policy promoting tax incentives should be preferred to direct public investments, as tax 
incentives would minimize the problem of monitoring the quality of investments and 
management ability. Firms interested in benefiting from this fiscal advantage would 
need to face ‘stock market valuation’. Examination of the stock price pattern would 
enable policymakers to assess and monitor the effectiveness of innovation policies. 
Thus the tax advantages for firms complying with the above mentioned requirements 
would help to reduce the degree of discretionality of public investment. In addition, 
given the existence of asymmetric information in financial markets, this would generate 
a ‘virtuous circle’ based on self-selection. Firms confident of the quality of their R&D 
investments would have an incentive to take advantage of the capital gains in the stock 
markets that would, in addition, trigger a tax reduction. Tax distortion on capital 
allocation would be reduced in innovative sectors. Furthermore, in institutional contexts 
where financial markets are not fully developed and very few public companies exist, 
the incumbent companies would act to increase the size of financial markets. Finally, in 
some ‘bank oriented’ financial systems where financial markets are not yet widely 
extended (see Allen and Gale 2000 in this regard) and the market for control by firms is 
not always linked to the market for shares, policies consisting of tax incentives for R&D 
expenditures for the issuance of stock market shares could create a positive externality, 
through the increase in the size and competition of the financial markets, thereby 
creating an actual and effective market for control by firms. As argued by the 
Rosenberg studies (2000, 1982), a wide historical and empirical evidence for the US 
seems to suggest that in many industries technological innovation has been successfully 
introduced by the new entrants rather than the incumbent dominant firms. If this is the 
case, the above mentioned mechanism of fiscal incentives would motivate both new 
firms to enter the market and incumbent dominant firms (usually already well present in 
the stock markets) to increase their expenditure in R&D in association with issuing new 
shares. 
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